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Fragmented patient care and resultant data fragmentation across disparate healthcare providers drive up 
medical costs. Thus, there is a rising interest in developing patient-centered health information technology 
(HIT) that offers the promise of connecting patients and healthcare providers to patients' health data from 
multiple sources. Despite progress, there exist disparities in patient access to patient-centered HIT. A recent 
report of more than 1100 healthcare consumers shows that 31 percent cannot easily obtain their medical 
records from their healthcare provider which prevents them from sharing data with another provider 
(Health 2017). Patient access to patient-centered HIT is fundamental as it enables collection and sharing of 
the patient’s data so that healthcare providers could provide better care, improve efficiency and thereby 
lower medical costs. In this study, we focus on health information exchange1 (HIE), a distinct patient-
centered HIT which facilitates capturing, storing, sharing, and retrieval of patient health information of 
medical providers across organizational boundaries (Ayabakan et al. 2017), and we define patient access to 
HIE as the capability of the patient and health providers to appropriately access and securely share the 
patient’s health data via HIE. Despite the numerous efforts to improve patient access to HIE, it is unclear 
whether and how patient access to HIE could lead to a reduction in medical costs.  
The literature on digital divide has offered valuable insights on the consequences of the divide in access to 
ICT (e.g., computers and Internet), such as inequality of learning outcomes arising from the divide in 
student digital access (Wei et al. 2011). It is noteworthy that patient access to HIE is very different from 
user access to ICT examined in prior studies because the use of HIE involves two types of end users—both 
patients and healthcare professionals who act as agents of patients. When there are costs to the physician 
associated with the use of HIE, physician agency would become an unneglectable issue in understanding 
how medical costs would be affected. Combining the theory of information sharing and physician agency, 
we identify two aspects of the impact of access to HIE on medical costs in the inpatient setting. On one hand, 
based on the theory of information sharing, we argue that patient access to HIE could directly lead to lower 
 
1 "health information exchange" stands for both the verb denoting sharing of information and the noun 
denoting the technology of which the governance and technical structures enable information sharing in a 
secure and reliable way.  
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test costs of a hospitalization episode by curtailing unnecessary medical testing (Ayabakan et al. 2017). On 
the other hand, access to HIE can create spillover effects at the department level. We argue that income loss 
and efficiency improvement of a hospital department could create a link between a patient’s access to HIE 
and the medication costs of another patient. From the perspective of physicians whose incomes are linked 
to their department revenue, the reduction in test costs for patients with access to HIE would mean a loss 
of department revenue and thus individual physicians’ income (Agarwal et al. 2010). The income effect 
hypothesis suggests that physicians acting as patients’ agents would have the ability and desire to induce 
demand in response to negative income shock (McGuire 2000). As the information asymmetry regarding 
the demand for prescription medications is particularly great (Lundin 2000), one would expect that 
physicians would compensate for the income loss by inducing more medication demand. Thus, the 
medication costs of hospitalization episodes would be increased due to the spillovers from access to HIE of 
other patients in the same department. Nevertheless, income loss could be mitigated by increasing the 
number of admissions as it is another important contributor to a department’s revenue (Handel et al. 2010). 
The potential of increase in the number of admissions could be realized if departments capitalize on the 
HIE to improve technical efficiency (i.e., increasing the number of discharges given fixed inputs), which in 
turn leads to enhanced capacity to accommodate more demand. We argue that compared to low-demand 
departments, high-demand departments that have more unmet inpatient demand are more likely to turn 
increased capacity into more admissions of new patients and thus gain financial benefits. Therefore, one 
would expect a “within-department” spillover effect on medication costs from access to HIE of other 
patients, which would be less salient for high-demand departments though.  
The Chinese healthcare system provides a compelling context to explore these questions because the 
government has taken a number of initiatives for HIE development, but there is still a gap in access to HIE 
across different patient groups. Our goal in this research is to investigate the direct and spillover effects of 
access to HIE on the medical costs of a hospitalization episode. To this end, we examine the impact of a 
regional HIE in China which was accessible to only a specific patient group, and we exploit the HIE 
implementation as a natural experiment. We leverage discharge data from a participating hospital to 
compare the medical costs between patients with access and patients without access to the HIE. We employ 
propensity score matching and difference-in-difference to estimate the direct effects of access to HIE on 
test costs. To investigate the spillover effects, we exploit the variation in the percentage of patients with 
access to HIE in a department. We find that access to HIE has a negative effect on test costs, and it has 
spillover effects on medication costs for low-demand departments. We further show that the spillover 
effects are linked to income loss and efficiency improvement of a department. To assess the income-loss 
mechanism, we investigate the changes in the test revenues of a department related to the percentage of 
patients with access to HIE. Furthermore, the efficiency-improvement mechanism is validated by testing 
the changes in the number of admissions of a department and length of stay of a hospitalization.  
This study makes contributions to several streams of literature. First, prior research investigating the 
impact of HIE has focused on either test costs or overall medical costs. Although HIEs are found to have 
negative effects on test costs, HIE impact on overall medical costs is inconclusive. HIEs are found to reduce 
medical costs in some hospitals (Frisse and Holmes 2007; Frisse et al. 2012; Tzeel et al. 2011), but not in 
some others (Bailey et al. 2013; Lang et al. 2006). We give an in-depth examination of the HIE impact on 
different medical costs. Specifically, we propose differential and even contrasting effects of HIEs on test 
costs and medication costs—test costs of a hospitalization episode would be directly reduced while 
medication costs could be increased through spillover effects. Additionally, we extend the literature on 
evaluation of HIT investments. Prior research in this stream of literature has adopted either a production 
view or a process view. Studies adopting a production view use production function or stochastic frontier 
analysis to analyze the impact of HIT investments on cost reduction at an aggregate level (Menon et al. 
2000; Menon et al. 2009). In contrast, studies adopting process view examine how HIT could reduce costs 
associated with utilization of services through improvement in the care process such as improvement in 
adherence to recommended care and reduction in medication error at a granular level (Bates et al. 1997; 
Teich et al. 2000). In this research, we consider both aggregate- and granular-level (i.e., department- and 
hospitalization-level) mechanisms. Moreover, we highlight the income-loss and efficiency-improvement 
mechanisms at the department level that drive the spillover effects. Lastly, this study contributes to the 
literature on physician agency by investigating the role of physicians in achieving effective cost control.  
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Background 
Waste and Inefficiency in Healthcare  
Per capita inpatient expenditure in public hospital has risen significantly in recent years in China, from 
CNY 6194 in 2010 to CNY 8890 in 2017. Furthermore, diagnostic test expenditure and medication/drug 
expenditure accounted for as high as 7.1% and 43.1% of total inpatient expenditure in 2010, and 8.9% and 
31.3% in 2017 (See Chinese Health Statistics Yearbook 2018).  
The fragmented nature of the health care system is one critical reason for the unnecessary healthcare 
services which drives the increasing medical costs. Primary health care in China is weak and its core 
function in gatekeeping or care-coordination is not met (Yip and Hsiao 2014). This makes the healthcare 
system in China even more fragmented and hospital-centric, with public hospitals delivering approximately 
90% of the inpatient and outpatient care (Yip and Hsiao 2014). A typical patient receives diagnosis and 
treatment from different hospitals which usually use disparate information systems to digitalize, process 
and store patient data. The fragmented healthcare delivery and unstandardized patient data result in siloed 
patient medical information (Miller and Tucker 2014). The lack of interoperability between information 
systems across hospitals creates significant technical barriers to retrieving patient data directly from other 
hospitals (Ayabakan et al. 2017). For this reason, physicians rely on paper-based medical records or the 
patient’s self-report for obtaining patient data, and the data obtained is usually not completely accurate or 
interpretable. In such situations, physicians tend to repeat diagnostic tests and/or prescribe redundant 
medications to improve diagnosis and treatment outcomes.  
The profit-driven behavior and its resulting excessive use of diagnostic tests and medication have been 
recognized as influential factors of the drastic increase in hospitalization expenditures (Liu et al. 2000). 
Under the fee-for-service payment method, healthcare providers are paid for the quantity of care. There is 
little motivation for healthcare providers to reduce medical expenditures for their patients or the insurance 
provider. Public hospitals in China are self-financing entities as they are responsible for their own profit 
and loss. While public hospitals receive government subsidies, health services charges account for 
approximately 90% of their revenues (Yip and Hsiao 2014). With fee-for-service still the dominant payment 
mechanism for hospitals, hospitals encourage physicians to prescribe drugs and tests that are not clinically 
needed. Furthermore, starting in 2006, hospitals are allowed to set a 15% markup on drug sales, which 
makes drug sales an important revenue source for hospitals (Liu et al. 2000). In order to achieve the 
financial goal of the hospitals, physicians have been paid a bonus since the 1980s; typically, each 
department of a hospital is given a revenue target, and the department can use the residual income to pay 
bonuses for the physicians (Liu et al. 2000). Given that the government sets physicians’ basic salaries at a 
very low level, physicians have strong incentives to enlarge their income by gaining bonuses through their 
services to patients. A survey in 2007 suggests that many physicians felt compelled to earn or to supplement 
their livelihood through the sale of drugs or the performance of diagnostic tests (Fan 2007).  
Policies Addressing Waste and Inefficiency   
The Ministry of Health of China has taken persistent efforts to build a care delivery system that is cost 
effective and of better quality to respond to the population needs. Among the numerous early attempts to 
address waste and inefficiency, some yielded modest success while others aggravated the problem. For 
example, the government set artificially low prices for outpatient visits, essential medicine, and standard 
diagnostic tests. However, in response to the restrictions, hospitals increased their supply of services not 
covered by restrictions, such as prescribing longer hospital stays and more expensive diagnosis and 
medicine (Liu et al. 2000). Though regulations could curb providers’ aberrant behavior in the short term, 
providers have ingenious ways of getting around regulations in place due to the pervasive information 
asymmetries in the sector. Besides, third-party payers may have neither capacity nor incentives to control 
the behavior of health care providers. Physician payment reform is an alternative strategy for alleviating 
inefficiency. Indeed, it has shown promising results. For example, average expenditure per admission fell 
below the level at fee-for-service hospitals after Hainan province implemented prospective payment at six 
key hospitals in 1997 (Yip and Eggleston 2004). However, it also creates new concerns such as underuse of 
needed services (Becher and Chassin 2001).  
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The ongoing national health reform in China has also facilitated many HIE projects. Most of the HIE 
projects are financed and owned by the government, and public hospitals are the main participating entities. 
A governance model will be set up for the HIE project to develop the relevant policy and agreement to assure 
compliance. At a technical level, HIEs increase interoperability by facilitating the use of the same standards 
and supporting the automated transmission of patient data in a secure manner. The data architecture of 
HIEs could be a centralized model where all patient data is uploaded to a central data repository, a 
distributed model where each hospital maintains the patient data and exchanges patient data through HIE, 
or a hybrid model containing elements of both. Unlike price regulations or physician payment reform, HIEs 
do not involve substantial changes in governance and incentive structures. It is important to understand, 
in such a situation, whether and how HIE could help reduce waste and inefficiency, so as to control medical 
costs. 
Related Literature and Hypotheses Development  
Redundant Tests and Health Information Sharing  
The fragmented healthcare delivery has been recognized as one important driver for unnecessary tests 
(Miller and Tucker 2014). Patients often seek health services from multiple healthcare providers, and this 
would generate redundancy of medical tests (Ayabakan et al. 2017). Prior studies often view a test as 
redundant if a test of the same type had previously been ordered within its test-specific interval (Bates et 
al. 1998). The redundancy of diagnostic tests is pervasive in the inpatient setting where patients tend to 
have complex conditions and need a series of diagnostic tests. Prior study has shown that at least 8.6% of a 
defined group of commonly performed tests in the inpatient setting are redundant (Bates et al. 1998).  
Patient access to HIE denotes that his/her medical information is stored in a standardized format and could 
be shared securely across healthcare providers via HIE. Medical information such as previous medications, 
laboratory test reports, radiology images, and allergies which were previously unavailable could be easily 
accessed by the physician when the patient is admitted. Compared with the conventional ways of hospitals 
sharing health information—through paper-based reports or patient self-report, HIEs provide a more 
convenient way for physicians to retrieve comprehensive and accurate patient’s medical information. The 
availability of accurate and complete information could foster effective communications between patients 
and physicians and help physicians to better understand the patient’s medical history (Frisse 2010). HIEs 
not only increase interoperability of patient data but also facilitate trusted exchange among participating 
hospitals. It reduces the information sharing barriers associated with liability risks of acknowledging tests 
done in other hospitals. Thus, physicians could avoid carrying out redundant diagnostic tests for the patient 
who has access to HIE without diminishing the quality of diagnosis and medical decisions.  
As test ordering is controlled by physicians, the realization of such benefits hinges on physician behavior. 
Given the burden of increasing patient intake with limited beds, we argue that physicians have the 
motivation to utilize easy access to patient information to save time and achieve expedited care delivery. 
Furthermore, access to HIE also equips the patient with information that could facilitate better 
communication with the physician. With copayment, one would expect that patients still have the 
motivation to avoid repeated testing to reduce medical expenditure. The patient would exert more influence 
on constraining the physician’s test-ordering behavior. The patient may remind the physician of the 
available data of good quality in HIEs or insist on using the test results of previous tests. Redundant tests 
which would have been carried out for the reason of the physician’s defensive practice or financial incentives 
could be avoided due to the pressure from the patient. Overall, patient access to HIE gives the physician 
both opportunity and pressure to reduce redundant testing. Therefore, we hypothesize that  
H1: The test costs of a hospitalization episode will be reduced if the patient has access to HIE. 
Physician Agency and Income Effect 
While HIEs could cause a reduction in the test costs of a hospitalization episode on one hand, on the other 
hand, it also means a loss in the revenues of the department (Walker et al. 2005). The individual physicians’ 
incomes which are tied with the department revenues would also be negatively affected. Physicians acting 
as the agent of patients may take undesirable reactions to the loss of incomes. In the field of health 
economics, it is well recognized that the professional relationship builds on the information gap between 
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physician and patient, and permits the physician to decide the demand. Prior research has adopted the 
concept of physician-induced demand to explain and predict physician behavior. A precise definition of 
physician-induced demand is provided as follows: 
“Physician-induced demand exists when the physician influences a patient’s demand for care against the 
physician’s interpretation of the best interests of the patient” (McGuire 2000). 
The main assumption of physician-induced demand is asymmetric information between the physician and 
the patient, and, in the case of third-party financing the medical care, between physician and the insurance 
provider (Evans 1974). Ideally, physicians should supply services based on medical evaluation, and social 
and patient costs, without regard to their private economic interests; physicians act as “double agents” to 
achieve efficiency in service provision (Lundin 2000). Nevertheless, because the patient is poorly informed 
and/or the insurance providers do not have a perfect evaluation of physician’s service, the physician has the 
opportunity to influence the amount of healthcare service to maximize his/her own interest (McGuire 
2000). Because many of the characteristics of patients and physicians that determine the appropriate 
amount of service are unobserved, it is impossible for researchers to determine whether a physician induces 
demand with regard to their own economic interests. A large body of literature has adopted alternative 
strategies to identify physician-induced demand. Particularly, many studies test for induced demand by 
using an exogenous shock to physician’s incomes (McGuire 2000). Prior studies have found that the 
reduction in physician fees, especially Medicare fee changes in the U.S. increased treatment intensity (Earle 
2013; Gruber et al. 1999; Yip 1998), and within-state fertility declines led to within-state increases in highly 
reimbursed caesarean delivery in lieu of normal childbirth (Gruber and Owings 1996). Altogether, these 
evidences support the income effect hypothesis that physicians respond to a potential loss of incomes by 
increasing demand (McGuire and Pauly 1991).  
In our context, we contend that the income effect would dominate the physician behavior because of high 
financial pressures faced by physicians. The more patients having access to HIE, the more loss of the 
department revenue would incur. In the situation where individual physicians’ incomes are tied with the 
department revenues, the department-specific shock would motivate the physicians to use more services. 
In the literature of health economics, demand inducement for medicine has long been a matter of concern 
because deciding appropriate amount and types of medicine involves much information asymmetry, and 
thus medicine demand is pervasively distorted (Lundin 2000). Moreover, the fee-for-service payment 
scheme, coupled with policy-permitted markup of medicine sales, further incentivizes physicians to induce 
demand for medication to achieve their desired incomes. Though HIEs make the prescription information 
more transparent between providers, lack of perfect methods to evaluate the appropriateness of medicine 
demand makes it difficult to regulate the physicians’ prescription behavior. Thus, one would expect a 
negative “within-department” spillover effect of access to HIE. Specifically, the more the percentage of 
patients having access to HIE in a department, the more loss of incomes would incur, resulting in more 
medicine demand for the patients in the same department. We therefore hypothesize that 
H2a: The medication costs of a hospitalization episode will be positively associated with the 
percentage of patients having access to HIE in the department. 
We have argued that physicians could increase medication costs for each patient to compensate for the 
income loss. Alternatively, physicians could capitalize on the use of HIE to increase technical efficiency (i.e., 
increasing the number of discharges given a fixed number of professionals and beds) and admit more 
patients. Indeed, physicians would have a strong motivation to take the latter approach to maximize their 
incomes because even under the fee-for-service payment, there is a reimburment ceiling (i.e,. maximum 
reimbursement amount per capita) specified by the medical insurance schemes in China. 
There have been abundant evidence in the literature showing that investments in HIT could improve 
technical efficiency (i.e., increasing the number of patients processed) (Watcharasriroj and Tang 2004). In 
our context, HIEs offer the opportunities to improve technical efficiency mainly through shortening length 
of stay. Timeliness is one of the benefits of using HIE. Time spent by the hospital staff in verifying 
information could be reduced, which includes that of medical tests, results and diagnoses of patients (Blaya 
et al. 2010). Moreover, the comprehensive and accurate information including previous medicine list and 
allergies offered by HIEs could largely reduce drug interactions and other adverse drug events. Therefore, 
healthcare is safer by using HIE, and it helps to reduce inpatient length of stay (Kaelber and Bates 2007).  
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Additionally, the increase in technical efficiency would be more financially beneficial for high-demand 
departments in which insufficient capacity to effectively meet inpatient demand is a key bottleneck 
constraining their revenues. Improved efficiency could help the high-demand departments to free up beds 
for new patients and accommodate more demand that was previously unmet. As a consequence, the 
reduction in test costs would be less likely a concern to the high-demand departments as they can admit 
more new patients. The negative externality of access to HIE would be less salient for the high-demand 
departments. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
H2b: The positive effect of the percentage of patients having access to HIE in the department 
on the medication costs of a hospitalization episode will be stronger for low-demand 
departments than high-demand departments. 
Research Method 
Research Context 
Our research context is a tertiary public hospital (hereinafter referred to as the focal hospital) in China 
which participated in a city-wide HIE. The HIE was funded by the local government institution, and there 
were in total 23 public hospitals participating in the HIE project. The implementation of HIE in the focal 
hospital began in March 2008, and it was officially put into use in April 2008. Along with the HIE 
implementation, the government also introduced a policy which encourages mutual acknowledgment of 
test results across hospitals.  
Prior to the HIE implementation, patient data was siloed within the hospital where the data was created. 
As hospitals adopted different information systems, patient data was scattered across hospitals, and it was 
difficult for hospitals to communicate with each other. The primary way to exchange health information 
was through a printed copy of medical records, handwritten paper medical records, or patient self-report.  
The HIE implementation involved creating a centralized data repository which could provide authorized 
users (e.g., physicians) with secure and efficient access to data in it. The central data repository guaranteed 
a high level of interoperability as all the participating hospitals had to upload and retrieve health data in 
the same format and interpret the data in the same way. The HIE implementation also involved the 
integration between the central data repository and the existing systems in the hospital including hospital 
information systems (Agarwal et al.), electronic health record systems (EHR), laboratory information 
systems (LIS), picture archiving and communication systems (PACS), and radiology information systems 
(RIS). After the HIE system had been seamlessly integrated with the internal systems, these internal 
systems would upload patient data every day in an automatic manner. Data uploaded to the data repository 
included patients’ demographic information, summaries of outpatient visits and inpatient admissions, 
medication histories, laboratory results, radiology images and reports, and clinical notes.  
Physicians were authorized to search and view a patient’s medical information via HIE at the point of care. 
From the physician’s perspective, retrieving full patient data from HIE required little time and effort beyond 
a few clicks. A plug-in was installed in the physician workstation for accessing patient data via the HIE. 
Figure 1 shows the on-demand information retrieval process in the inpatient setting. Upon the physician’s 
search request, the internal system would send the request to the central system which would in turn return 
the requested information from the central data repository.  
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Figure 1 Information Retrieval Process 
For the purpose of providing patients with access to HIE and creating patient files, the HIE project also 
involved assigning a unique identification number to each patient (hereinafter referred to as HIE ID 
number). The HIE ID number would be required for outpatient or inpatient admission registration in the 
23 participating hospitals. The HIE ID number also allowed the patient to register and login to a portal to 
view their test results published by the hospital.  
Importantly for our purposes, the HIE system was not accessible to patients all at once but instead rolled 
out over the course of one year. Beginning April 2008, the system was accessible to patients who subscribe 
to local public medical insurance plan (hereinafter referred to as subscribers) only. Subscribers were 
typically local residents or workers. The HIE ID number for the subscribers is the same as their insurance 
ID number. Whereas, there was no existing ID number that could be used as the HIE ID number for 
nonsubscribers. Nonsubscribers comprised mainly of patients from other cities and local residents who 
opted out of the local insurance plan. According to a report of local government, nonsubscribers had to 
obtain their HIE ID number by collecting physical ID card from one of the 23 participating hospitals. 
Because of technical constraints pertaining to preparing the physical ID cards, nonsubscribers did not have 
access to HIE until March 2009. 
According to a public report by the HIE project, till the end of 2009, there had been around 11 million 
patient profiles, 30 million medical records, 150 million prescription records, 620,000 discharge 
summaries and 1.2 million test reports in the HIE data repository; 3000 test reports had been viewed by 
patients per month; the HIE had been used more than 90,000 times by all healthcare professionals per day, 
and the response time per search request was less than 5 seconds.  
Data and Variables 
We obtained a full dataset containing all discharge records generated by the hosipital hnformation system 
(HIS) in the focal hospital. The dataset provides data on medical expenditure of each hospitalization and 
patient data including gender, age, disease description, etc. Our data spans 13 months from September 
2007 to September 2008. As HIE was implemented in March 2008, hospitalizations occurring in March 
2008 or hospitalizations beginning before March 2008 but ending after March 2008 were not included for 
model estimation. The final dataset contains 59,129 hospitalizations in 39 departments over 52 weeks (26 
weeks before and 26 weeks after the HIE implementation).  
Medical costs. The total medical expenditure of a hospitalization episode could be disaggregated into six 
categories provided in the dataset. The six categories and examples of items in each category are reported 
in table 1. In our study, the test costs are measured as the aggregate costs of lab tests and radiology tests, 
and the medication costs include the costs of all kinds of medications prescribed during the hospital. 
Furthermore, we use a monthly CPI to adjust the medical costs for inflation. The log-transformed inflation-
adjusted test costs, Test Cost, and medication costs, MedCost are the dependent variables of interest.  
Table 1 Medical Cost Categories 
Category  Examples of item 
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1. Lab Test Blood test, urinalysis 
2. Radiology Test Ultrasonography, X-ray, electrocorticography, Intraocular pressure 
examination, CT scan, Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), Digital 
subtraction angiography (DSA), medical examination 
3. Medication Western drug, Chinese patent medicine, Chinese herbal drug 
4. Surgery & Material Surgery, anesthesia, surgical materials & instruments, other medical materials  
5. Specialty Treatment Consultation, infrared therapy, dressing change, traction 
6. Miscellaneous 
Expenses 
Bed, meal, nursing care 
Access to HIE. Our dataset provides information regarding whether the patient is a subscriber of the local 
public insurance plan. Our assignment of observations to treatment and control groups creates the binary 
variable, Group, which takes on a value of 1 if the inpatient is a subscriber of the local public insurance plan, 
otherwise 0. A econd binary variable, Post, takes on a value of 1 if the hospitalization took place after the 
HIE implementation, otherwise 0. Our central independent variable of interest is the treatment variable 
HIE, which is the interaction term between Group and Post. HIE measures whether the patient had access 
to HIE when he/she was admitted.  
Hospitalization-level control variables. To obtain robust estimates of the effect of access to HIE, we 
control for potentially confounding factors at the hospitalization level. First, we control for patient gender, 
age, the severity of illness, comorbidity, admission type. Comorbidity was assessed based on whether a 
second condition was indicated in the dataset. The admission types included admissions from outpatient, 
emergency admissions and hospital transfers. We also control for the accumulated number of times that 
the patient had been admitted in the focal hospital since September 2006 (N_hosp). A binary variable 
indicating whether the patient had been discharged in the same department in the previous 30 days 
(IfReadmission) was also included.  Furthermore, the ICD 10 diagnosis code in the dataset allows us to 
categorize observations into 189 disease types according to ICD 10 subchapters.  
“Within-department” spillover. To measure the spillover effects, we consider the percentage of 
patients having access to HIE over the total number of admissions in the department in a week, PercHIE. 
We consider admissions rather than discharges because diagnostic tests usually take place at the initial 
stage of hospitalization, and thus the percentage of HIE admissions could represent how the department 
revenue could be affected. To examine the differences in the spillover effects across high-demand and low-
demand departments, we measure the bed demand of departments (=number of patients admitted/number 
of available beds) in the pre-treatment period and then use the mean value as the cutoff value to indicate if 
a department is low-demand or high-demand. Using bed information of 31 departments, we categorize 19 
departments as low-demand departments and 12 departments as high-demand departments. 
Department-level control variables. To account for possible confounding occurring at the department 
level, we also control for department-weekly level variables including number of admissions and admission 
composition by treatment assignment, gender, age, the severity of illness. etc. Table 2 presents the summary 
statistics for the dependent variables, main independent variables, and control variables used in the 
analysis. 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean (%) Standard Deviation Min Max 
Dependent variables  
TestCost (log transformed test costs) 6.79 1.75 0 10.71 
MedCost (log transformed medication costs) 6.88 2.09 0 12.37 
Independent variables  
HIE 0.233 0.423 0 1 
PercHIE 0.242 0.276 0 1 
Hospitalization-level control  variables  
Group (control/treatment group) 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Post (Before/after HIE implementation) 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Age   47.17 22.64 0 106 
N_Hosp (accumulated number of hospitalizations) 1.76 2.22 1 40 
Comorbid (0=no comorbid disease; 1= comorbid 
disease) 
0.39 0.49 0 1 
IfR dmission (discharged in previous 30 days or 
not) 
0.09 0.28 0 1 
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Gender      
   female 44.78%    
   male 50.73%    
   newborn infants 4.49%    
Severity (severity of illness) 
    
   Not severe 96.77%    
   Severe 2.22%    
   Unknown 1.01%    
Admission (admission mode) 
    
   1:from outpatient  77.06% 
   
   2:Emergency admission 22.93%    
   3:from another hospital 0.01%    
Department-weekly level control  variables  
Num_adm (log transformed number of admissions) 4.104 1.086 0.69
3 
5.78
4 Perc_treatgroup (percentage of patients in the 
treatment group) 
0.487 0.198 0 1 
Perc_male 0.528 0.207 0 1 
Perc_severity 0.023 0.060 0 0.77
8 Perc_comorbid 0.399 0.243 0 1 
Perc_admission1 0.770 0.157 0 1 
Perc_admission2 0.230 0.157 0 1 
Perc_readmission 0.091 0.127 0 1 
Perc_age1 (age 0-1) 0.017 0.071 0 0.5 
Perc_age2 (age 2-17) 0.065 0.137 0 1 
Perc_age3 (age 18-34) 0.247 0.245 0 1 
Perc_age4 (age 35-64) 0.412 0.197 0 1 
Perc_age5 (age>65) 0.260 0.226 0 1 
Perc_hosp1 (N_Hosp=1) 0.758 0.209 0 1 
Perc_hosp2 (N_Hosp=2) 0.111 0.079 0 1 
Perc_hosp3 (N_Hosp>2) 0.131 0.177 0 1 
Notes. Observations=59,129 
Identification Strategies  
We use the phased roll-out of the HIE as a natural experiment in order to understand the effect of access to 
HIE on the medical costs of a hospitalization episode. Our identification strategy for the impacts of access 
to HIE is based on the propensity score matching (PSM) and difference-in-difference (DID) methods. PSM 
is a method wherein treated observations and untreated observations are matched on the estimated 
probability of receiving treatment based on their observable characteristics, thereby creating a comparable 
counterfactual. DID is an analytical approach where variation across patients having access to HIE at 
difference times is exploited. The combination of PSM and DID, the MDID estimator, is also becoming 
increasingly popular as their combined strengths offset their individual weaknesses. The main appeal of 
this combined approach is that it mitigates both selection on observables (PSM) (e.g., in our context, if there 
are compositional changes across groups and across time) and selection on unobservables (DID) (e.g., in 
our context, if patients in the treatment group and the control group have different propensities to be 
admitted in the focal hospital). Our MDID approach would be valid if (1) conditional on the observables, 
the treatment group would have had the same trend in the dependent variable as the control group in the 
absence of intervention (common trend assumption); (2) and all treated individuals have a counterpart in 
each of the three control groups (common support assumption) (Blundell and Costa Dias 2009).  
Propensity score is computed using a probit model with hospitalization characteristics as explanatory 
variables, i.e., (1) patient gender (Gender), (2) patient age (Age), (3) severity of illness (Severity), (4) 
Whether the hospitalization is a readmission (IfReadmission), (5) accumulated number of hospitalizations 
(N_hosp), (6) disease group based on ICD 10 chapters, and (7) department. We further included some 
quadratic and interaction terms to improve the quality of matching. These set of consumer covariates are 
comprehensive and informative, such that they influence the propensity of the patient being admitted and 
yet are not affected by the HIE implementation, thus satisfying the unconfoundedness identification 
assumption of PSM. We use kernel matching to match each of the control groups (control group before and 
after the HIE implementation and treatment group before the HIE implementation) to the treatment group 
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after the HIE implementation. Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth equal to 0.05 is used to match treated 
observations with a weighted average of all controls with weights that are inversely proportional to the 
distance between propensity scores of treated and controls (i.e., exact matches are given a large weight, and 
poor matches a small weight). After matching, the standardized differences between the treated group and 
each of the control groups in terms of the above characteristics are below 0.1, indicating a satisfying 
covariate balance (Austin 2009). The sample restricted to the common support contains 54,574 
observations, and it will be used for the main analysis.  
Empirical Model  
We estimate the following fixed-effect model for our main analysis:  
Yijt = β1HIEijt + β2PercHIEi,t−1 + Xijt + Mi,t−1 + ωt +  ui + ϵijt                     (1) 
where Yijt  is the log-transformed test cost or medication costs of a hospitalization episode  j in the 
department i in time period t. β1 is the DID estimate which captures the changes in Yijt for the treatment 
group relative to that of the control group. We consider department-level patient access to HIE in the 
previous period (PercHIEi,t−1) to avoid simultaneity issues and to allow for lagged spillover effects denoted 
by β2. We include hospitalization-level controls (Xijt) such as gender, age, and severity in the regression 
model. We also control for department-level controls in the previous period (Mi,t−1) such as the number of 
admissions and composition of admissions by gender, age and severity.  ωt  denotes time period fixed 
effects; ui represents department fixed effects; and ϵijt is the error term.  
To obtain the MDID estimate, we estimate the above regression model by specifying pweight option in Stata 
so that Stata uses the sampling weight produced by the kernel matching when computing estimates of the 
regression parameters. 
Model Estimation and Results   
Table 3 presents the results for Equation (1) where we estimate the direct and spillover effects of access to 
HIE on test costs and medication costs.  
Effects on test costs. First, we find that some control variables explain the test costs (Table 3, column 1). 
For example, age, severity, and comorbidity have a positive effect on test costs while readmissions, the 
accumulated number of hospitalization and emergency admissions (compared to admission from 
outpatient) have a negative effect on test costs. In addition, as shown in table 3, column 2, the DID 
parameter estimate is -0.106, which is significantly negative. This implies a significant negative impact of 
10.6% in test costs after having access to HIE. Patient access to HIE has a significant negative impact on 
test costs, which gives credence to further explore the spillover effects caused by income loss. 
To the extent that differences in unobservables may result in pre-treatment heterogeneity in test costs 
across treatment and control group, these two groups would be incomparable in terms of test costs. To 
address this concern, we explicitly test parallel pretreatment trend in the regression where we include the 
interaction terms between a series of time dummies and the variable Group. We therefore model test costs 
using the following specification: 
TestCostijt = ∑ γ0sPres ∗ Groupij
S
s=1 + ∑ γ1sPosts ∗ Groupij
S
s=1 + Xijt + ηt + ui + ϵijt      (2) 
where Pres is the indicator for the time period that is s periods before the HIE implementation. Thus, γ0s 
measures the treatment group’s differential change in TestCostijt, where change is measured with respect 
to the baseline period (i.e., Pre1). We specify one month as a time period and there are 6 pre-treatment time 
periods (i.e., S=6). In addition, we include the interaction terms between indicators for each of the post-
treatment time period and the variable Group to investigate the dynamics of the effect. As equation (1), 
hospitalization-level controls, department and disease type fixed effects are included. Month fixed effects 
are also included. Table 4 presents the results for equation (2). We see no significant differential effect 
between the two groups in each of the pre-treatment periods, with only one exception. We conclude that 
the common trend assumption of MDID model is not being violated. Furthermore, we see that the effect of 
access to HIE is insignificant initially, but become significant one month after the HIE implementation.  
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Effects on medication costs. As shown in Table 3, column 3 and column 4, some controls have a 
significant impact on medication costs, but the DID parameter estimate is not significant. We therefore 
focus on the spillover effects on medication costs. We find that PercHIE has no significant effect on 
medicine cost overall (Table 3, column 5), but the subsample analysis where we test the spillover effects in 
low-demand and high-demand departments (Table 3, column 6 and column 7) shows that PercHIE has a 
significant positive impact on medication costs for low-demand departments only. The estimates indicate 
that for low-demand departments, one more percentage of patients with access to HIE in the department 
increases the medication costs of all patients in the department by 0.479% (Table 3, column 6). 
























VARIABLES TestCost TestCost MedCost MedCost MedCost MedCost MedCost 
HIE  -0.106***  -0.003 -0.005 0.004 -0.073** 
 (0.027)  (0.030) (0.031) (0.048) (0.037) 
PercHIE     0.129 0.479*** -0.127 
    (0.090) (0.184) (0.106) 
Group 0.016 0.071*** 0.110*** 0.112*** 0.108*** 0.164*** 0.042 
(0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.022) (0.022) (0.035) (0.026) 
Post -0.047 0.064* 0.081** 0.156*** -0.135 0.149 0.046 
(0.034) (0.038) (0.038) (0.044) (0.127) (0.148) (0.123) 
Gender 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.079*** 0.089*** 0.043** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.022) 
Age 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Severity 0.390*** 0.390*** 0.800*** 0.800*** 0.797*** 0.588*** 0.979*** 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.060) (0.089) 
Comorbidity 0.449*** 0.449*** 0.534*** 0.534*** 0.536*** 0.637*** 0.389*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.030) (0.023) 
Ifreadmission -0.687*** -0.688*** 0.374*** 0.374*** 0.376*** 0.419*** 0.126*** 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.045) (0.045) 
N_Hosp -0.032*** -0.032*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.008 0.059*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
Admission2 -0.214*** -0.214*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.217*** -0.092*** 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.032) (0.032) 
Admission3 -0.111 -0.140 0.028 0.027 -0.010 -1.188*** 1.114** 
(0.339) (0.340) (0.494) (0.494) (0.499) (0.101) (0.519) 
Num_Adm     -0.066 -0.016 -0.221*** 
    (0.045) (0.061) (0.071) 
Perc_treatgroup     0.071 0.164 -0.042 
    (0.096) (0.149) (0.113) 
Perc_male      -0.281*** -0.321** -0.338* 
    (0.103) (0.135) (0.175) 
Perc_severity      -0.125 -0.432 0.105 
    (0.297) (0.324) (0.827) 
Perc_comorbid      -0.030 0.159 -0.340** 
    (0.093) (0.132) (0.139) 
Perc_admission1      -1.269 -0.494 -6.391 
    (2.468) (3.032) (5.519) 
Perc_admission2      -1.276 -0.615 -6.102 
    (2.465) (3.026) (5.523) 
    -0.286* -0.234 -0.346 
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Perc_readmission      (0.168) (0.218) (0.234) 
Perc_age1     0.801 2.651 -1.195 
    (1.258) (2.799) (1.190) 
Perc_age2     -0.199 -0.349 0.118 
    (0.218) (0.290) (0.353) 
Perc_age3     0.171 0.140 -0.0454 
    (0.156) (0.225) (0.215) 
Perc_age4     0.089 0.106 -0.120 
    (0.107) (0.150) (0.170) 
Perc_hosp1     -0.024 0.132 -0.477** 
    (0.137) (0.177) (0.234) 
Perc_hosp2     -0.116 -0.392* 0.0222 




Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Number of 
departments 
39 39 39 39 39 19 12 
Observations 53,574 53,574 53,574 53,574 52,313 21,754 29,783 
R-squared 0.443 0.443 0.518 0.518 0.519 0.375 0.617 
Notes. *<0.1 **<0.05 ***0.01 robust standard error in parentheses.  
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post6*group -0.162** 
(0.073) 
Hospitalization-level controls Included 
Department, month, disease category fixed effects Included 
Number of departments 39 
Observations 53,574 
R-squared 0.444 
Notes. *<0.1 **<0.05 ***0.01 robust standard error in parentheses.  
The Mechanisms of the Spillover Effects 
Income Loss. The primary mechanism for the spillover effects to occur is loss of department revenue 
which would in turn lead to loss of physician income. When more patients have access to HIE, the 
department is more likely to have lower revenues associated with testing. If this argument holds, we should 
observe a negative relationship between the percentage of discharged patients with access to HIE and the 
average test costs. We therefore average the test costs at the department-week level and estimate the effect 
of percentage of HIE patients in the discharges in a week on their average test costs. Five departments with 
too few observations (i.e, number of observations<12) are excluded. Table 5 presents the estimation results. 
We see that percentage of HIE patients in the discharges has a significant negative effect on the average test 
costs after controlling for the number of discharges, percentage of patients in the treatment group, and 
composition of discharges by other hospitalization characteristics. The estimates in Table 5 suggest that 
one more percentage of patients with access to HIE decreases the average test costs by 0.174%. This 
evidence indicates that patient access to HIE would be a revenue threat to the departments, which supports 
the income-loss mechanism.  
Efficiency improvement. Our efficiency-improvement mechanism suggests that if departments could 
improve their efficiency and admit more patients, the spillover effects caused by income loss would be 
mitigated. We have shown that the spillover effects are not significant for high-demand departments. To 
test whether the insignificance is due to efficiency-improvement mechanism, we test whether high-demand 
departments (1) improve their efficiency, (2) and admitted more patients after the HIE implementation.  
First, if high-demand departments improve their efficiency, we should observe a decrease in the inpatient 
length of stay. Table 6 shows the result where we test the effect of patient access to HIE on length of a 
hospital stay. We find that length of stay for patients who have access to HIE is shorter for high-demand 
departments only (Table 6, column 3). The hospital stays of patients who have access to HIE in high-
demand departments are shortened by around 0.9 days. This evidence indicates that high-departments free 
up beds more quickly and enhance more in the capacity to accommodate more inpatient demand.  
Table 5 Income Loss (Department-Week Analysis) 
 (1) 
VARIABLES TestCost_Ave 
PercHIE (in discharges) -0.174* 
(0.102) 
perc_treatgroup (in discharges) 0.278** 
(0.116) 




Composition of discharges by gender, age, severity, 
comorbidity, readmission, admission type, and N_hosp 
Included 
Department, week fixed effects Included 
Number of departments 34 
Observations 1,736 
R-squared 0.832 
Notes. *<0.1 **<0.05 ***0.01 robust standard error in parentheses.  
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Table 6 Efficiency Improvement by Demand of Department 
 (1) (2) 
 
(3) 
 FULL Low-demand departments High-demand departments 
VARIABLES lengthofstay lengthofstay lengthofstay 
HIE -0.478 -0.380 -0.904** 
(0.337) (0.525) (0.457) 
Group  -0.546*** -0.598** -0.161 
(0.166) (0.278) (0.178) 
Post 3.231 5.191 1.346 
(2.049) (3.688) (1.463) 
PercHIE -0.961 2.706 -0.647 
(0.985) (2.462) (0.900) 
Hospitalization- and 
department- level controls 
Included Included Included 
Department, disease category, 
week fixed effects 
Included Included Included 
Number of departments 39 19 12 
Observations 55,051 22,106 30,330 
R-squared 0.132 0.167 0.069 
Notes. *<0.1 **<0.05 ***0.01 robust standard error in parentheses.  
Second, we attempt to assess whether the high-demand departments indeed meet more demand after the 
HIE implementation. As the number of available beds largely constrain the demand that could be met, we 
control for it by measuring the met demand as bed demand (i.e., the number of admissions divided by the 
number of available beds). We conduct a department-weekly level analysis to test the effect of the 
percentage of patients with access to HIE (PercHIE) in the previous period on the met bed demand. We 
expect that PercHIE in previous period would have a positive effect on the met bed demand. The results in 
Table 7 show that the effect of PercHIE on the met bed demand is not significant for both low-demand and 
high-demand departments. However, we see that the effect is positive and larger in magnitude for high-
demand departments. One possibility is that the high-demand departments did not respond quickly to the 
increased capacity immediately after the HIE implementation. To explore this possibility, we dropped the 
four weeks immediately after the HIE implementation and re-estimate the model. The results show that 
percentage of patients having access to HIE admitted in the previous period has a positive effect on the met 
bed demand after dropping the weeks immediately after the HIE implementation. 
Table 7 Changes in Bed Demand by Demand of Department (Department-Week Analysis) 
 (1)           
FULL 
(2)                                    
Low-demand departments 
(3)                                      
High-demand departments 
VARIABLES BedDemand BedDemand BedDemand 
PercHIE 0.057 0.023 0.113 
(0.042) (0.026) (0.080) 
Post 0.084* 0.068*** 0.028 
(0.048) (0.026) (0.088) 
Perc_treatgroup -0.147*** -0.056** -0.326** 
(0.048) (0.023) (0.165) 
Department-weekly level controls Included Included Included 
Department, week fixed effects Included  Included Included 
Number of departments 31 19 12 
Observations 1,571 947 624 
R-squared 0.863 0.790 0.830 
Notes. *<0.1 **<0.05 ***0.01 robust standard error in parentheses.  
Table 8  Changes in Bed Demand by Demand of Department (Department-Week Analysis) 
 three weeks immediately after HIE 
implementation are dropped 
four weeks immediately after HIE 
implementation are dropped 
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 (1)           
FULL 








(4)         
FULL 








VARIABLES BedDemand BedDemand BedDemand BedDemand BedDemand BedDemand 
PercHIE 0.0663 0.0192 0.147* 0.0729* 0.0158 0.168** 
(0.0427) (0.0265) (0.0812) (0.0426) (0.0269) (0.0802) 
Post 0.0782* 0.0674** 0.0564 0.0938** 0.0690** 0.183 
(0.0424) (0.0300) (0.0908) (0.0412) (0.0302) (0.128) 
Perc_treatgroup -0.150*** -0.0547** -0.327* -0.147*** -0.0569** -0.303* 




Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Department, week 
fixed effects 
Included  Included Included Included  Included Included 
Number of 
departments 
31 19 12 31 19 12 
Observations 1,480 892 588 1,450 874 576 
R-squared 0.867 0.785 0.838 0.867 0.785 0.840 
 
Discussion and Contribution  
Our study investigates the direct and spillover effects of patient access to HIE on medical costs and it has 
several notable findings. First, we empirically show that patient access to HIE leads to a significant decrease 
in the test costs of a hospitalization episode. Thus, H1 is supported. Second, our study shows that patient 
access to HIE has spillover effects on medication costs of patients in the same department for low-demand 
departments only. Hence, H2a is not supported, and H2b is supported. Our in-depth examination of 
spillover effects of HIE access shows that income loss and efficiency improvement provide mechanisms that 
could drive or mitigate spillover effects. Understanding these spillover effects helps shed light on whether 
patient access to HIE leads to a reduction in medical costs at the macro level.  
Theoretical Contributions and Practical Implications  
This study makes contributions to the literature in several ways. First, this study provides an in-depth 
examination of the impact of access to HIE on both test costs and medication costs. While prior studies 
have explicitly or implicitly presumed that HIE could reduce both test costs and other medical costs, our 
findings suggest differential and even contrasting effects of HIEs on test costs and medication costs. The 
medical cost savings resulting from a reduction in test costs would be compromised by an increase in 
medication costs.  
In contrast to prior research evaluating HIT investment payoff, our research is among the first to 
incorporate the consequence of divide in access to HIT when investigating the impact of patient access to 
HIT on medical costs. To this end, we consider both department- and hospitalization-level mechanisms. 
We find that at the hospitalization level, HIEs could lower test costs through reduction in redundancy of 
diagnostic testing. Moreover, we look beyond the hospitalization level and consider the financial impacts of 
HIE at the department level. At the department level, access to HIE creates spillover effects on medication 
costs so that divide in access does not lead to a difference in medication costs but both groups experience 
an increase in medication costs. Our in-depth examination of spillover effects attests to the fact that income-
loss and efficiency-improvement mechanisms could influence the occurance of the spillover effects of 
patient access to HIE. Our findings underscore that addressing the physician’s concerns about income loss 
is important to attenuate the spillover effects.  
Lastly, this study extends to the literature on physician agency. Prior studies have investigated the response 
of physicians to the income shock due to change in service fee or physician-population ratio. Our findings 
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indicate that patient access to HIE would lead to a negative income shock and it would also motivate the 
physicians to compensate for the income loss. We accentuate the role of physicians in achieving effective 
cost control such that use of HIE may ironically increase medical costs due to physicians’ financial concerns 
and exploitation of the inherent information asymmetry between patient and physician.  
Our study quantifies the benefits of access to HIE as a mean to reduce test costs. Consistent with the intent 
of HIE implementation, our results show that patient access to HIE can significantly reduce the inpatient 
test costs. Our result implies a significant negative impact of 10.6% in test costs after having access to HIE. 
There is a need to promote regional HIEs and encourage patient as well as healthcare providers to adopt 
HIEs for obviating redundant tests. We also find that use of HIE may unexpectedly cause an increase in 
medication costs in a traditional fee-for-service setting. In the fee-for-service setting, physicians’ incomes 
are dependent on the quantities of services. The benefits of access to HIE in reducing test costs could 
become a financial concern to healthcare providers. The government should watch out for demand 
inducement which could be intensified by the physician use of HIE. The government needs to align the 
incentives for healthcare providers to discourage profit-making activities that drive medical costs. Without 
financing reforms that detach the physician’s incentives from health services charges, investments in HIEs 
might actually aggravate the inefficiency problem. Indeed, the transformation from the traditional fee-for-
service payment model to outcome-based payment model has shown some promising results in medical 
cost containment. The government might also need to help the hospital to address financial challenges by 
increasing subsidy for the hospital. Shortage of public funds has certainly been the main motivation for 
public hospitals to seek private payments.  
Reference 
Agarwal, R., Gao, G., DesRoches, C., and Jha, A. K. 2010. "The Digital Transformation of Healthcare: Current Status 
and the Road Ahead," Information Systems Research (21:4), pp. 796-809. 
Ambra Health. 2017. "Era of Change: Today’s Healthcare Consumer." from https://ambrahealth.com/ebook/era-
change-todays-healthcare-consumer/ 
Austin, P. C. 2009. "Using the Standardized Difference to Compare the Prevalence of a Binary Variable between Two 
Groups in Observational Research," Communications in Statistics - Simulation and Computation (38:6), pp. 
1228-1234. 
Ayabakan, S., Bardhan, I., Zheng, Z. E., and Kirksey, K. 2017. "The Impact of Health Information Sharing on 
Duplicate Testing," MIS Quarterly (41:4), pp. 1083-1103. 
Bailey, J. E., Pope, R. A., Elliott, E. C., Wan, J. Y., Waters, T. M., and Frisse, M. E. 2013. "Health Information 
Exchange Reduces Repeated Diagnostic Imaging for Back Pain," Annals of Emergency Medicine (62:1), pp. 
16-24. 
Bates, D. W., Boyle, D. L., Rittenberg, E., and Kuperman, G. J. 1998. "What Proportion of Common Diagnostic Tests 
Appear Redundant?," The American Journal of Medicine (104:4), pp. 361-368. 
Bates, D. W., Kuperman, G. J., Jha, A., Teich, J. M., Orav, J., Ma’luf, N., Onderdonk, A., Pugatch, R., Wybenga, D., 
Winkelman, J., Brennan, T. A., Komaroff, A. L., and Tanasijevic, M. J. 1997. "Does the Computerized 
Display of Charges Affect Inpatient Ancillary Test Utilization?," Archives of Internal Medicine (157:21). 
Becher, E. C., and Chassin, M. R. 2001. "Improving the Quality of Health Care: Who Will Lead?," Health Affairs 
(20:5), pp. 164-179. 
Blaya, J. A., Fraser, H. S. F., and Holt, B. 2010. "E-Health Technologies Show Promise in Developing Countries," 
Health Affairs (29:2), pp. 244-251. 
Blundell, R., and Costa Dias, M. 2009. "Alternative Approaches to Evaluation in Empirical Microeconomics," Journal 
of Human Resources (44:3), pp. 565-640. 
Earle, M. J. T. Y. C. J. P. N. C. C. 2013. "Physician Agency and Competition: Evidence from a Change to Medicare 
Chemotherapy Reimbursement Policy," in: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Evans, R. G. 1974. "Supplier-Induced Demand: Some Empirical Evidence and Implications," in The Economics of 
Health and Medical Care. Springer, pp. 162-173. 
Fan, R. 2007. "Corrupt Practices in Chinese Medical Care: The Root in Public Policies and a Call for Confucian-
Market Approach," Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal (17:2), pp. 111-131. 
Frisse, M. E. 2010. "Health Information Exchange in Memphis: Impact on the Physician-Patient Relationship," 
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics (38:1), pp. 50-57. 
Frisse, M. E., and Holmes, R. L. 2007. "Estimated Financial Savings Associated with Health Information Exchange 
and Ambulatory Care Referral," Journal of Biomedical Informatics (40:6), pp. S27-S32. 
 Patient access to HIE: direct and spillover effects 
  
 Fortieth International Conference on Information Systems, Munich 2019 17 
Frisse, M. E., Johnson, K. B., Nian, H., Davison, C. L., Gadd, C. S., Unertl, K. M., Turri, P. A., and Chen, Q. 2012. 
"The Financial Impact of Health Information Exchange on Emergency Department Care," Journal of the 
American Medical Informatics Association (19:3), pp. 328-333. 
Gruber, J., Kim, J., and Mayzlin, D. 1999. "Physician Fees and Procedure Intensitya: The Case of Cesarean Delivery," 
Journal of Health Economics (18:4). 
Gruber, J., and Owings, M. 1996. "Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery," The RAND Journal 
of Economics (27:1), pp. 99-123. 
Handel, D. A., Hilton, J. A., Ward, M. J., Rabin, E., Zwemer, F. L., Jr., and Pines, J. M. 2010. "Emergency Department 
Throughput, Crowding, and Financial Outcomes for Hospitals," Academic Emergency Medicine (17:8), pp. 
840-847. 
Kaelber, D. C., and Bates, D. W. 2007. "Health Information Exchange and Patient Safety," Journal of Biomedical 
Informatics (40:6), pp. 40-45. 
Lang, E., Afilalo, M., Vandal, A. C., Boivin, J. F., Xue, X., Colacone, A., Leger, R., Shrier, I., and Rosenthal, S. 2006. 
"Impact of an Electronic Link between the Emergency Department and Family Physicians: A Randomized 
Controlled Trial," Canadian Medical Association Journal (174:3), pp. 313-318. 
Liu, X., Liu, Y., and Chen, N. 2000. "The Chinese Experience of Hospital Price Regulation," Health Policy and 
Planning (15:2), pp. 157-163. 
Lundin, D. 2000. "Moral Hazard in Physician Prescription Behavior," Journal of Health Economics (19:5), pp. 639-
662. 
McGuire, T. G. 2000. "Physician Agency," in Handbook of Health Economics, A.J. Culyer and J.P. Newhouse (eds.). 
Elsevier, pp. 461-536. 
McGuire, T. G., and Pauly, M. V. 1991. "Physician Response to Fee Changes with Multiple Payers," Journal of Health 
Economics (10:4), pp. 385-410. 
Menon, N. M., Lee, B., and Eldenburg, L. 2000. "Productivity of Information Systems in the Healthcare Industry," 
Information Systems Research (11:1), pp. 83-92. 
Menon, N. M., Yaylacicegi, U., and Cezar, A. 2009. "Differential Effects of the Two Types of Information Systems: 
A Hospital-Based Study," Journal of Management Information Systems (26:1), pp. 297-316. 
Miller, A. R., and Tucker, C. 2014. "Health Information Exchange, System Size and Information Silos," Journal of 
Health Economics (33), pp. 28-42. 
Ministry of Health of China. 2018. " Chinese Health Statistics Yearbook." Beijing: People's Health Press. 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., and Podsakoff, N. P. 2003. "Common Method Biases in Behavioral 
Research: A Critical Review of the Literature and Recommended Remedies.," Journal of Applied Psychology 
(88:5), pp. 879-903. 
Teich, J. M., Merchia, P. R., Schmiz, J. L., Kuperman, G. J., Spurr, C. D., and Bates, D. W. 2000. "Effects of 
Computerized Physician Order Entry on Prescribing Practices," Archives of Internal Medicine (160:18), pp. 
2741-2747. 
Tzeel, A., Lawnicki, V., and Pemble, K. R. 2011. "The Business Case for Payer Support of Community-Based Health 
Information Exchange: A Humana Pilot Evaluating Its Effectiveness in Cost Control for Plan Members 
Seeking Emergency Department Care," American Health & Drug Benefits (4:4), pp. 207-215. 
Walker, J., Pan, E., Johnston, D., Adler-Milstein, J., Bates, D. W., and Middleton, B. 2005. "The Value of Health Care 
Information Exchange and Interoperability," Health Affairs (24), pp. W5-10. 
Watcharasriroj, B., and Tang, J. C. S. 2004. "The Effects of Size and Information Technology on Hospital Efficiency," 
The Journal of High Technology Management Research (15:1), pp. 1-16. 
Wei, K.-K., Teo, H.-H., Chan, H. C., and Tan, B. C. Y. 2011. "Conceptualizing and Testing a Social Cognitive Model 
of the Digital Divide," Information Systems Research (22:1), pp. 170-187. 
Yip, W., and Eggleston, K. 2004. "Addressing Government and Market Failures with Payment Incentives: Hospital 
Reimbursement Reform in Hainan, China," Social Science & Medicine (58:2), pp. 267-277. 
Yip, W., and Hsiao, W. 2014. "Harnessing the Privatisation of China's Fragmented Health-Care Delivery," The Lancet 
(384:9945), pp. 805-818. 
Yip, W. C. 1998. "Physician Response to Medicare Fee Reductions: Changes in the Volume of Coronary Artery 
Bypass Graft Cabg Surgeries in the Medicare and Private Sectors," Journal of Health Economics (17:6), pp. 
675-699. 
 
